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I

n early 2003 an Israeli agent in the Gaza Strip telephoned Mustafa, a
wealthy Palestinian merchant in Gaza, to inform him that over the previous
three months his son Ahmad had been preparing for a suicide bombing mission in Israel. Mustafa was told that if his son followed through with his plans,
he and his family would suffer severe consequences: their home would be demolished, and Israel would cut off all commercial ties with Mustafa’s company. Neither he nor the members of his family would ever be permitted to
enter Israel again.1 Faced with this ultimatum, Mustafa confronted his son
and convinced him that the cost to his family would far outweigh any possible
benefits his sacrifice might have for the Palestinian people.
Since the start of the second Palestinian intifada in September 2000,
Israeli authorities have prevented more than 340 suicide bombings from advancing beyond the planning stages. In addition, they have intercepted 142
would-be bombers, most of whom were en route to destinations deep within Israel.2 The war against Palestinian terrorism, like the war on terrorism more
broadly, aims to prevent terrorists, including suicide bombers, from achieving
their objectives. Suicide bombers are the most sophisticated smart bombs ever
devised. They are well integrated into their communities, they are mobile, and
they often can choose the best moment in which to wreak the greatest havoc
and produce the highest number of casualties. Yet as the case of Mustafa and
his son illustrates, the right mix of threats in at least some instances challenges
the conventional wisdom that suicide bombers are undeterrable.
In the war on terrorism, in which suicide bombers have repeatedly
demonstrated their deadly efficiency, the United States and its friends and allies confront challenges similar to those Israel has dealt with for years. To
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meet these challenges, the United States and other opponents of terrorism
will need a strategy that can more effectively address this threat.
Classical deterrence theory, which emerged after World War II with
the buildup of the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union
and the subsequent concern over the possibility of total annihilation, is inapplicable to the war on terrorism. The Cold War divided the world into two opposing camps. The United States and the Soviet Union, with more than
enough destructive power to wipe out humanity several times over, relied on
their burgeoning arsenals to maintain the peace between them.
The literature on classical deterrence inspired by the Cold War typically characterizes the deterrent threat posed by the United States and the Soviet Union as a dichotomy: nuclear deterrence would be successful so long as
the price for launching a nuclear war was mutual assured destruction. Although classical deterrence, as articulated and practiced during the Cold War,
did not prevent conventional conflicts such as the Korean War and the war in
Vietnam, in neither case did the United States or the Soviet Union resort to the
use of nuclear weapons to bring them to an end.
In some situations, however, the logic of classical deterrence theory
has proved hugely irrelevant. One particularly notable case is the ArabIsraeli conflict. Following defeat in three full-scale wars in 1948, 1956, and
1967, Israel’s committed enemies responded by gradually shifting their main
objective from the total destruction of Israel to a strategy of limited war to
achieve limited objectives. Another effect of these defeats (including the war
in 1973) was a noticeable increase in moderation among Arab leaders, including Egypt’s Anwar al-Sadat, Syria’s Hafiz al-Assad, Jordan’s King Hussein,
and even the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat vis-à-vis their Israeli neighbor.
A second significant exception to the usefulness of classical deterrence theory is the current war on global terrorism. Classical deterrence had no
relevance for the 19 al Qaeda operatives who took control of four commercial
jetliners on 11 September 2001, slamming two into the World Trade Center and
a third into the Pentagon. Only the bravery and determination of several passengers on the fourth plane, whose struggle with the hijackers caused it to crash
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into an empty field in Pennsylvania, prevented even greater catastrophe. Classical deterrence also has little salience for al Qaeda more generally or militant
groups linked to it. In the war on terrorism, the United States and its friends
and allies need a strategy that does not rest on the same dichotomous, all-ornothing conceptualization of deterrence that prevailed during the Cold War.
This article presents a different conceptualization of deterrence, one
best described as cumulative deterrence. Cumulative deterrence illuminates
the reasons why Israel, in its more than 50-year history, not only has managed
to survive in an exceedingly hostile neighborhood but also has made tremendous strides in improving its overall strategic situation. It has done so through
the considered application of threats and military force on the one hand and
assorted incentives on the other.
The war on terrorism will not be decided with a single, overwhelming blow. It is a war that will demand extreme patience, unshakable resolve,
international cooperation, and a creative, harmonized mix of defensive and
offensive measures. It will require policies that seek to improve the political,
economic, and social conditions of those living in places where terrorism is
allowed to flourish and martyrdom is encouraged. It also will require inducements that steer would-be terrorists (including potential suicide bombers)
away from their destructive impulses and toward the creation of free, prosperous, and secure societies.
A cumulative deterrence strategy designed for the war on terrorism
would build on victories achieved over the short, medium, and long terms that
gradually wear down the enemy. It would involve a multilayered, highly orchestrated effort to inflict the greatest damage possible on the terrorists and
their weapon systems, infrastructure, support networks, financial flows, and
other means of support. It would demand excellent intelligence, a broad coalition, and a globalized network that would facilitate the exchange of vital
information and encourage transparency. Finally, it would require cuttingedge technology and highly trained military forces. The ultimate goal should
always be 100 percent enemy inaction.
The next section describes the key differences between classical and
cumulative deterrence. The following section considers the application of the
cumulative deterrence model to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The usefulness of
cumulative deterrence for the global war on terrorism is the subject of the
penultimate section. The conclusion summarizes the article’s main findings.

Classical Deterrence vs. Cumulative Deterrence
Classical deterrence and cumulative deterrence differ in fundamental ways: from conceptualization to implementation to desired results.
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Classical Deterrence
Classical deterrence theory emerged in the aftermath of World War II
in response to the growing hostility between the United States and the Soviet
Union as well as their NATO and Warsaw Pact allies. The threat of mutual assured destruction made the notion of a nuclear first strike unthinkable. Thus,
confronted with horrific images of a “nuclear winter,” the superpowers, while
nevertheless continuing to build up their nuclear arsenals to staggering heights
over the next half century, stopped short of giving the order to unleash even one
of these fearsome weapons. Although both the United States and the Soviet
Union would engage in proxy wars throughout the Cold War, the threat that any
of these could escalate into a nuclear exchange was a constant reminder of the
awesome destructive power of these two formidable adversaries.
Scholars frequently define deterrence in dichotomous terms. For Patrick Morgan, deterrence is “the use of threats of harm to prevent someone from
doing something you do not want him to.”3 Yehoshaphat Harkabi defines deterrence as the “threat of heavy punishment for an act by the enemy in order to persuade him to desist from that act.”4 Zeev Maoz sees deterrence as “a policy
through which one attempts to scare off a would-be attacker by holding out a
drawn sword. It works as long as the sword is not being used. When the sword
becomes covered with blood, deterrence is said to have failed, no matter whose
blood was spilled.”5 These and other standard definitions of deterrence share a
common assumption: deterrence is successful so long as aggression does not
take place; failure is the occurrence of a single violent act.
In writing about the effectiveness of the threat of nuclear retaliation
during the Cold War, two other highly respected scholars, Alexander George
and Richard Smoke, assert that although “‘massive retaliation’ was one enormously potent threat, it often lacked enough credibility and relevance to deter
some types of challenges to deterrence commitments made by the United
States on behalf of its foreign policy interests.”6 In some cases, a weaker adversary might adopt what George and Smoke refer to as the “designing
around” approach.7 According to this approach, an enemy that recognizes its
operational limitations vis-à-vis a militarily superior opponent will adjust its
tactics and operations to play to its strengths.8 Examples include the use of
guerrilla warfare in Vietnam, the 1968-70 War of Attrition between Egypt
and Israel along the Suez Canal, and Hezbollah’s operational shift against Israel following the latter’s pullout from southern Lebanon in May 2000.
The cumulative deterrence model, discussed in the next section,
posits an explanation of enduring conventional conflicts that do not fit within
the classical deterrence model for a variety of reasons. Perhaps the most significant reason is that it assumes from the beginning that there will be reWinter 2004-05
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peated breaches of the first line of security.9 The model builds on the work of
George and Smoke, among others.10
Cumulative Deterrence
Unlike classical deterrence as practiced during the Cold War, and
whose success hinged on a bipolar standoff that held in check any impulse to
launch a nuclear first strike, cumulative deterrence is based on the simultaneous use of threats and military force over the course of an extended conflict.
Some scholars argue that such a strategy is not deterrence at all—that the
sword is bloodied—and therefore oppose the notion that deterrence can be
cumulative. One such scholar is Jack Levy, who criticizes Zeev Maoz’s methodology for measuring the effectiveness of deterrence: “Maoz’s definition of
success and failure,” according to Levy, “is not appropriate for the analysis of
the success or failure of deterrent threats. A dispute which escalates to war is
coded as a success for that side which wins the war militarily. This may be
useful for the theoretical questions he is asking, but from the perspective of
deterrence, such an outcome should be treated as failure.”11 Thus, Levy employs the same all-or-nothing criteria for assessing the effectiveness of deterrence as scholars writing about classical deterrence.
Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, the first scholars to offer a definition of
long-term, regional conflict, measure the volume of conflict using statistical
methods.12 In their study, Huth and Russett adopted Patrick Morgan’s basic
conceptualization of deterrence, which has two components: general deterrence and immediate deterrence. General deterrence characterizes relations
between states that view each other’s motives with suspicion and hostility over
an extended period of time. Immediate deterrence involves specific crises that
threaten to erupt into full-scale war. According to Huth and Russett, such crises
can result from the breakdown of general deterrence; this breakdown occurs
over the following five stages: (1) adoption by the defender of a strategy of
general deterrence; (2) emergence of a challenge by a rival that threatens the
status quo; (3) adoption by the defender of a strategy of immediate deterrence;
(4) continued threats from the rival; and (5) the failure of immediate deterrence, which causes the defender to consider a military response.13
Using Morgan’s definitions of general deterrence and immediate deterrence, Huth and Russett regard a continuing conflict as one that has lasted
at least 20 years, during which the adversaries engage in no fewer than five
battles. Examples include Israel and Egypt from 1948 to 1979, Israel and Lebanon from 1948 to 2000, and Israel and Syria from 1948 to the present. Maoz
defines a continuing conflict as one that extends beyond 25 years, with a maximum gap of ten years between clashes; if this period is longer than ten years,
the conflict is considered continuous only if the territorial issue at stake re8
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Figure 1. Classical Deterrence versus Cumulative Deterrence.

mains unresolved and there is at least one military exchange within a 25-year
period.14 Examples include Israel and Jordan from 1948 to 1994, Israel and
Lebanon from 1976 to 2000, and Israel and Syria from 1974 to the present.
Cumulative deterrence works on two levels. On the macro level, it
seeks to create an image of overwhelming military supremacy. On the micro
level, it relies on specific military responses to specific threats or hostile acts.
Cumulative deterrence has several key features. First, its effectiveness is measured in terms of the number of victories accumulated over the duration of the
conflict, which we can think of as “assets in a victory bank.” Second, over time
these victories produce increasingly moderate behavior on the part of the adversary and a shift in his strategic, operational, and tactical goals until there is a
near-absence of direct conflict. Third, this moderation may eventually result in
political negotiations and perhaps even a peace agreement. Figure 1 summarizes the main differences between classical and cumulative deterrence.
The next section offers evidence of the success of cumulative deterrence in the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Through a string of Israeli victories and recognition among Arab states of their growing inability to counter
Israel’s ever-increasing military capabilities, Israel’s cumulative deterrence
Winter 2004-05
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strategy has succeeded in fostering Arab moderation and improving Israel’s
overall strategic position in the region. One particularly noteworthy reflection of this change is the dramatic reduction in calls from Arab leaders for Israel’s destruction, which for so long served as one of the most powerful
rallying cries within the Arab world.

Cumulative Deterrence and the Israeli Experience
Some Israeli experts claim that Israeli deterrence is a mere myth. After all, in its relatively short history, Israel has engaged in numerous wars and
border conflicts, not to mention its involvement in the first Palestinian intifada from 1987 to 1993 and the ongoing second intifada.15
In contrast, I argue that Israel has essentially followed a cumulative
deterrent strategy with three key components. The first component consists of
the impressive array of military victories that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
have accrued against Arab adversaries since the establishment of the state
of Israel in 1948. The second factor is Israel’s huge technological-doctrinal
advantage over its Arab neighbors, which among other things has allowed
Israel not only to produce sophisticated weapon systems but also to improve
their integration at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. This same
technological-doctrinal advantage also has made possible targeted operations
against Israel’s adversaries. The third feature is Israel’s image as a nuclear
power, which the Israeli government has continued to hone while avoiding an
official declaration of the country’s nuclear capability. Figure 2 provides a
graphic representation of these military dimensions of Israeli deterrence.

Figure 2. The Military Force Dimensions of Israel’s Cumulative Deterrence Strategy.
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Mounting IDF victories between 1948 and 1988 resulted in a drastic
reduction of violence involving Israel’s principal adversaries, Egypt and
Syria.16 During this period, Israel engaged in six major wars: the 1948 war of
independence, the 1956 Suez War, the 1967 Six-Day War, the 1968-70 War of
Attrition along the Suez Canal, the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the 1982 war
in Lebanon, as well as numerous border clashes that at times threatened to
produce yet another full-scale regional war.
Uri Bar-Yosef is among the scholars who have recently noted the salience of the cumulative deterrence model. Bar-Yosef supports the argument
that Israel’s cumulative deterrence approach has succeeded in persuading
Arab states that the use of military force to defeat Israel is, in the long run, either operationally impossible or prohibitively expensive. According to BarYosef, “Cumulative deterrence is a long-term policy designed to persuade the
Arab side that conclusion of the conflict through the destruction of Israel is
impossible or that it entails a cost greater than the value of the benefit contained in such a move.”17
Bar-Yosef considers the 1967 Six-Day War to be a critical turning
point in Arab perceptions of Israel’s growing military might and the inability
of Arab states to effectively counter it. Following their humiliating defeat in
1967 (including the loss of the Golan Heights and the West Bank and Gaza
Strip), Arab states shifted to a strategy of limited war to achieve limited military goals. In the 1973 Yom Kippur War, for example, President Sadat announced the recapture of a short strip along the bank of the Suez Canal as
Egypt’s principal motive for going to war, while President Assad declared the
retaking of the Golan Heights as Syria’s foremost ambition.
Indeed, successive defeats over several decades eventually forced
both Egypt and Syria to shift their operational strategies against Israel.18 By
1975 Egypt had begun to exhibit marked moderation in its operational strategy
toward Israel. Tangible proof of this trend is the agreement on a framework for
peace reached by Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel and President
Anwar al-Sadat of Egypt at Camp David, Maryland, in 1978, which was followed by the signing of a peace treaty in 1979. Two years earlier, in a speech
before the Israeli parliament on 22 November 1977, Sadat publicly acknowledged Israel’s military superiority and the country’s right to exist. He asserted,
“We agree to live with you in just and lasting peace; we don’t want to attack you
or to be attacked by Israeli long-range missiles that might destroy us.”19
From 1976 to 1988, Syria also began to moderate its operational
stance vis-à-vis Israel. With Egypt’s signing of the Camp David peace treaty,
Syria lost its key strategic partner and thus was left on its own to confront Israel. Even earlier, however, shortly after the 1973 war, Syria forfeited interest
in launching a full-scale war against Israel, choosing instead to open up a secWinter 2004-05
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ondary front in southern Lebanon using Hezbollah as its proxy. (Although
Hezbollah remains a serious concern, Israel nonetheless occupies a better strategic position than it did before 1973.) Moreover, when Israel invaded southern Lebanon in Operation Peace for Galilee in 1982, Syria showed significant
restraint in using military power against Israel from the Golan Heights, largely
by adhering to a cease-fire agreement that had been drawn up in 1974.
Further compounding Syria’s difficulties, as well as diminishing the
Syrians’ capability to launch a surprise attack, was the demise of the Soviet
Union, which for years had been Syria’s primary military supplier. In 1995
Syria’s Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Hikmat Shiaby, declared, “Israel is
the strongest state in the region. The Israeli air force is able to reach Damascus in four minutes. Israel has everything: nuclear weapons and conventional
weapons. . . . Israel has got everything, including America.”20
Notably, other Arab leaders, including King Hussein of Jordan and Palestinian Chairman Arafat, eventually came to share the Egyptian and Syrian assessments of Israel’s overwhelming capabilities and their growing inability to
counter them effectively.21 In recognition of this insurmountable disadvantage,
Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1994, despite not having reestablished
control over the West Bank, which it had lost in the 1967 Six-Day War.
Thus, after more than 40 years of conflict, the cumulative effect of
Israel’s multiple victories was to vastly improve Israel’s overall strategic position in the Middle East. And through a combination of threatened retaliation
and military superiority, Israel has been able to shape and reinforce its deterrent image in the Middle East. As a result, the Palestinian Authority and Arab
states alike no longer call for—or continue to prepare militarily for—the destruction of Israel.
The use of threats and force, however, make up only the operational
layer of Israel’s cumulative deterrence strategy. Two other sets of factors—
one internal and the other external—also have been crucial to the success of
this strategy. Internal factors include Israel’s highly productive economy (especially in the field of high technology22), as well as its advanced infrastructure, well-regarded educational system, and superior qualitative manpower
system—not to mention intangibles such as unwavering resolve—and the
internal cohesiveness among all of these elements.
External factors consist of Israel’s numerous alliances, contracts,
and agreements with other countries, as well as its strategic relationship with
the United States, a regional alliance with Turkey, and peace agreements with
Egypt and Jordan. Also falling into this category are Arab perceptions of Israel’s image of power, in addition to the role of the media and public opinion.
Figure 3 shows these key strategic and operational dimensions of Israel’s cumulative deterrence strategy.
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External Factors

Strategic
Dimension

• Strategic Allies, Agreements,
and Alliances
• Public Opinion
Internal Factors
• Political, Economic, Social, and
Educational Systems
• Infrastructure
• Determination and
Endurance

Operational
Dimension

Military Power
• Military Strength, Real and Perceived

Figure 3. The Strategic and Operational Components of Israel’s
Cumulative Deterrence Strategy.

Although Israel’s cumulative deterrence strategy has shown extraordinarily good results in deterring states from launching direct attacks
against Israel, it is too early to judge its level of success against guerrilla and
terrorist operations, including heightened Palestinian terrorism since the start
of the second intifada. Nevertheless, it is possible to say that Israel’s cumulative deterrence approach appears to have successfully harmonized and integrated many of the most important operational components required for
success. These include:
l The strengthening of territorial defensive shields through the establishment of multilayered systems (including electronic fences,
high-technology sensors, special rules of engagement, security
buffer zones, and various delaying obstacles that slow would-be
terrorists from reaching their targets) and an increasing number of
professional units trained specifically to oppose the terrorist threat.
l Ongoing improvements in intelligence capabilities as a major force
multiplier.
l Consistent emphasis on infrastructure operations, such as demolishing the homes of terrorists’ families; destroying the terrorists’
weapon factories, storage facilities, and tunnels; and eliminating
the terrorists’ financial networks.
l Continued application of high technology to maintain Israel’s relative advantage.
Winter 2004-05
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l

l
l

Increased focus on special offensive capabilities: for example,
seizing the initiative, engaging in surprise raids, and undertaking
clandestine targeted operations—such as those against Sheikh
Yassin, the operational and spiritual leader of Hamas; his successor, Abdel Aziz Rantisi; and lower-level operatives—all of which
would be impossible without accurate intelligence and highly specialized equipment.
A well-balanced offensive and defensive doctrine.
Heightened efforts to improve political, economic, and social conditions to complement military measures.

Cumulative Deterrence and the War on Terrorism
Does the Israeli experience with cumulative deterrence yield lessons for the United States and its friends and allies in the global fight against
terrorism? If so, what would such a strategy look like? What would be its essential components? And how would success be measured?
As late as 1997, the military doctrine of the United States embraced an
essentially dichotomous approach to the country’s security and deterrent posture. In that year, US military doctrine defined deterrence as “the prevention
from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought
about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction.”23
The statement further asserted that if deterrence failed, the main objective was
to achieve victory: “Deterrence is our first line of security. If deterrence fails,
our objective is winning the nation’s wars.”24 This approach is ill-suited to
dealing with terrorists such as Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda organization,
when the first line of security will be repeatedly breached in any number of
ways. As US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has asserted, “The [war
on terrorism] is a marathon, not a sprint.”25
Indeed, in describing a meeting of President George W. Bush and his
top advisers shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Bob Woodward wrote, “It
was a somewhat obvious but an important point that got to the heart of the
problems they [Bush and his advisers] were facing—lack of good targets,
lack of inside intelligence sources, the worthlessness of deterrence strategy.”
All of which prompted President Bush to conclude, “Our strategy is more like
that of the Israelis.”26
Soon thereafter, President Bush ordered the Department of Defense
to devise a new strategy to address the increasingly deadly terrorist threat. In
response, the Defense Department assembled the National Defense University Task Force on Combating Terrorism. The task force proposed a “3-D
strategy” that had three principal goals: to defeat, deter, and diminish the enemy.27 By the time the strategy was officially adopted, the word “deter” had
14
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been replaced with two others: “deny” and “defend.” The final document, issued in February 2003, thus put forth a “4D strategy” that rests on four pillars:
to defeat, deny, diminish, and defend against the adversary.28 With this new
statement of purpose, the United States effectively jettisoned the doctrine of
classical deterrence that essentially became irrelevant with the 1991 collapse
of the Soviet Union. This more nuanced doctrine relies in part on the selective
use of military force to achieve US objectives. In this regard, the United
States, at least implicitly, appears to have adopted elements common to Israel’s cumulative deterrence approach.
The 9/11 terrorist attacks, not to mention the 1999 strike against USS
Cole and other terrorist actions, raises a knotty question that Israel has grappled with for years: is it possible to deter suicide bombers who are motivated
by a radical Islamist ideology and promises of martyrdom? The power of deterrence derives from the message it sends to would-be attackers: you will
pay an intolerable price for your actions. This threat would seem to have nothing to offer an adversary driven by an extremist ideology whose main tenet is
destruction of “the infidel,” and whose operatives expect to die in the effort.
Yet as illustrated by the case of the Palestinian merchant and his son
described at the beginning of this article, it is possible in at least some instances to deter a suicide bomber by threatening those close to him with extremely harsh consequences if they fail to stop him from carrying out his
mission. In other words, even in societies that nurture support for suicide
bombers, there are rational actors who can exert influence over these seemingly undeterrable individuals.
Other rational actors include Osama bin Laden and others who seek to
replace Arab regimes they view as corrupt, including the House of Saud, with
Islamic theocracies guided by the law of the Sharia and the early Caliphate.29
Bin Laden and al Qaeda’s top leaders see the use of suicide bombers as a means
toward their ultimate end: a Middle East free from the supposed corrupting influence of so-called infidels. Seen in this light, bin Laden may have believed
that the 9/11 terrorist attacks would provoke the United States into invading an
Arab state, which in turn might create regional instability and chaos that al
Qaeda and other terrorist groups could exploit to further their own ends.
The global war on terrorism is similar to the Arab-Israeli conflict
and the war against Palestinian terrorism in several respects: it pits two opposing ideologies against each other; it is an asymmetric conflict that will endure for many years; and it is a war that will not be won with a single, decisive
blow. It requires the simultaneous use of threats, hard power, and incentives
designed to give societies in which extremist ideologies flourish an alternative vision of their future. The war on terrorism is, in other words, a war in
need of a strategy of cumulative deterrence. In this war, the United States and
Winter 2004-05
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“The war on terrorism is a war in need of a
strategy of cumulative deterrence.”

its partners not only will have to accumulate individual victories (i.e., “assets
in a victory bank”), they also will have to diminish the enemy’s material capabilities to a degree that weakens the enemy’s resolve and makes clear the increasingly unacceptable price it will pay for its actions.
As mentioned earlier, at the core of the US strategy for combating terrorism that was articulated in February 2003 is a model for success that implicitly draws on the model of cumulative deterrence that has guided Israel’s
strategy toward its Arab neighbors for decades. At the heart of the United
States’ 4D strategy is the notion that victory is achievable only through a synergistic, multidimensional approach that utilizes “every instrument of national
power—diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, financial, information, intelligence, and military. Progress will come through the persistent accumulation
of successes—some seen, some unseen.”30
The United States clearly appreciates the magnitude of the task ahead:
There will be no quick or easy end to this conflict. . . . Ours is a strategy of direct
and continuous action against terrorist groups, the cumulative effect of which
will initially disrupt, over time degrade, and ultimately destroy the terrorist organizations. The more frequently and relentlessly we strike the terrorists across
all fronts, using all the tools of statecraft, the more effective we will be.31

The 4D strategy recognizes the need for a two-pronged effort that
marshals both internal and external forces to combat and perhaps eventually
eliminate the terrorist threat. Internal forces include factors such as the power
of political, economic, and social values; an overwhelming technological advantage; and an enormous infrastructure. External forces involve efforts to
enlist other countries in the fight by building partnerships and coalitions. As
the national strategy document on combating terrorism affirms, “Success will
not come by always acting alone, but through a powerful coalition of nations
maintaining a strong, united international front against terrorism.”32
The US strategy for combating terrorism is similar to Israel’s cumulative deterrence strategy not only with regard to its methodology and objectives but also with regard to the targets involved. There are two types of
targets against which the United States and its allies must continue to mount
16
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offensive operations. The first target consists of the terrorist organizations
themselves, including their leaders, operatives, and supporters, in addition to
the organizations’ infrastructure and financial and military resources. The
second target comprises states that harbor, sponsor, or otherwise support terrorists and sanction their violent acts.
The results of a strategy based on cumulative deterrence will need to
be measured over the short, medium, and long terms. Below are some of the
key indicators that should be carefully monitored:
l Enemy intentions: movements toward more moderate declarations, statements, and doctrine.
l Enemy capabilities and resources: reductions in numbers of followers, financial assets, weapon systems, infrastructure, and communications.
l Frequency of terrorist attacks: daily monitoring of such attacks that
shows a downward trend.
l Number of daily early-intelligence alerts: the lower this number,
the greater the success of cumulative deterrence.
As in the Israeli war against Palestinian terrorists, the goal in the
war on terrorism more generally is the total absence of terrorist attacks (i.e.,
a 100-percent success rate). But is this goal realistic? And what if the enemy’s objective is world destruction? One terrorist act with a weapon of
mass destruction (WMD) could cause unimaginable devastation, and there is
no guarantee in a world of proliferating WMD that such an operation could
not be mounted. Nevertheless, 100-percent deterrence must remain the ultimate objective.

Conclusion
To achieve success in the war on terrorism, the United States and its
friends and allies need a cumulative deterrence strategy similar to that pursued by Israel since its founding in 1948. The accumulation of Israeli victories against its principal Arab adversaries in 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973, in
parallel with Israel’s vast military and technological superiority, have fundamentally shifted the dynamics in the Middle East. No longer do Arab states
call for Israel’s total destruction. Indeed, two of these states, Egypt and Jordan, have signed peace treaties with their former adversary. Thus, Israel’s
overall strategic position in the region has greatly improved.
Although it is too early to determine the overall success of Israel’s
cumulative deterrence strategy against Palestinian terrorists, there are indications that Israeli responses to Palestinian suicide attacks since the eruption
of the second intifada in September 2000 have begun to take their toll. IDF
statistics show that in March 2002, more suicide bombers—17 in all—sucWinter 2004-05
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ceeded in carrying out their missions than in any other month since the start of
the second intifada. Since April 2002, the IDF has undertaken a number of actions that have produced a decline in terrorist attempts. In October 2003, for
example, the IDF thwarted the efforts of 22 would-be suicide bombers, the
most in any one-month period.33 Nevertheless, although Israeli intelligence
alerts suggest a weakening of Palestinian terrorist capabilities, more time is
needed before Israel’s cumulative deterrent strategy can be judged a complete success.
Meanwhile, in the war on terrorism, the United States, in addition to
marshaling its vast military capabilities, must strive to win the war of ideas. In
this ideological conflict, the stakes could not be higher. As Fareed Zakaria
writes, “The Arab world today is trapped between autocratic states and illiberal societies, neither of them fertile ground for liberal democracy. The dangerous dynamic between these two forces has produced a political climate
filled with religious extremism and violence.”34
Among the most deadly products of this poisonous mix are Islamic
extremists who become suicide bombers, as well as those who support them.
The United States and its friends and allies must therefore offer an acceptable
alternative to these extremists by helping to strengthen the position of moderates in the Islamic world. (Efforts to bring US-style democracy, however, are
only likely to elevate Islamic fundamentalists to power.) The United States
and others should work with local governments to establish parallel secular
social services, which would serve as an alternative to Islamic extremist-run
schools, hospitals, and mosques. Efforts should also be made to encourage
more open economies and political systems.
Only through the gradual implementation of such a holistic approach can the United States and others hope to win the hearts and minds of
those whose help is crucial in turning the tide against Islamic terrorists and
other extremists.
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